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NEW TAX RULES PERMITTING LIMITED
DEFERRAL OF UNEARNED INCOME
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue partially re-
versed his former position which had required accrual taxpayers to
include their unearned advances in income in the year of receipt.
Now certain accrual taxpayers will be allowed a limited deferral
of their unearned income. Revenue Procedure 71-211 permits ac-
crual taxpayers to defer for one year the portion of advance re-
ceipts allocable to the services to be performed in the next year.
Treasury Regulation 1.451-51 allows taxpayers selling inventoria-
ble goods to defer advance payments until the second year follow-
ing the year in which the total of advances received equals or
exceeds the cost of the goods to be delivered. Where the goods are
not inventoriable, the advances may be deferred until the year in
which goods are actually delivered.3
This article shall address itself to the problems of accrual
method taxpayers who seek to defer the reporting of the unearned
portion of advance payments received for the sale of goods or the
rendition of services until the year in which the corresponding
performance is to occur. As used herein, the term unearned in-
come4 will refer to that portion of an advance or prepaid receipt
which represents the value of the goods to be delivered or services
to be rendered in a future year. As it will be assumed that the
advance payment is income, the problem to be considered is when
such payment should be included in gross income. Although this
article will focus on the timing of receipts in income, the principles
examined are also applicable to other timing issues, notably the
timing of deductions.5 As a preface to the analysis of the principles
1. Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 549, superceding Rev. Proc. 70-21, 1970-2
Cum. BULL. 501.
2. Proposed August 7, 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 12612 (1970) and finalized March 23, 1971,
T.D. 7103, 36 Fed. Reg. 5495 (1971).
3. Events other than delivery which may be used to trigger inclusion of the advance in
income are shipment, buyer's acceptance or passage of title. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
l(c)(l)(ii) (1957).
4. Prepaid income, a synonymous term, is used frequently by the courts and writers.
5. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 162, 461. Other timing issues not herein considered
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and applications of Revenue Procedure 71-21 and Treasury Regu-
lation 1.451-5, existing case law and other background material
must be briefly considered. The cases, particularly those holding
in favor of the taxpayer, are important not only as historical back-
ground, but also for their value as authority for deferrals where
taxpayers are unable to fit within the requirements of the new
revenue procedure or regulation.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the enactment of the new rules, it had been the Com-
missioner's position that advance payments received by an accrual
taxpayer were to be included in income in the year of receipt,
although the advance was unearned to the extent that the services
had not been performed or the goods had not been delivered. This
position, while generally sustained by the courts, has been severely
criticized because it results in a distortion of income by placing
accrual taxpayers on a cash basis for their unearned income.'
Sound accounting principles for accrual taxpayers clearly require
that income be reported when earned, not when received.7
In light of the continuing reference to the divergence between
approved tax accounting methods and accepted business account-
ing principles, it is appropriate at this point to examine the ac-
counting profession's official position on the treatment of unearned
income. This position, set forth in the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants' Accounting Principles,' is as follows:
The realization principle requires that revenue be earned be-
fore it is recorded. . . . The requirement that revenue be earned
include: Prepaid Subscription Income, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 455; Prepaid Member-
ship Dues, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 456; Installment Sales, INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 453; Obligations Issued at Discount, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 454; Trading Stamps
and Coupons, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-4 (1957); Long-term Contract Method, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.451-3 (1957); Amortizable Bond Premium, Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c) (1957); and INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1311-1315, where there is a finding that an error was made in a
closed tax year.
6. See Cromartie, Clear Reflection of Income-Tax Accountin gMethods v. Generally
Accepted Methods, 47 TAXES 834 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cromartie]; Crumbley, How
Long Will the Commissioner and the Courts Ignore the Accounting Standards on the
Accrual of Prepaid Income?, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 559 (1969); Poole, The Taxation of Prepaid
Sales of Goods, 24 TAX L. REV. 375 (1969); Kupfer, Prepaid Income and Reserve for
Related Expenses, 27 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 631 (1969).
7. I CCH A.P.B. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (A.I.C.P.A.) § 1026, 17 (Oct., 1970). It
is anticipated that in the near future the accounting profession will reorganize its rule-
making structure. Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1972, at 8, col. I (Midwest ed.).
8. 1 CCH A.P.B. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (A.I.C.P.A.) § 1026, i 17 (Oct., 1970).
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becomes important, however, if money is received or amounts
are billed in advance of the delivery of goods or rendering of
services. For example, amounts for rent or magazine subscrip-
tions received in advance are not treated as revenue of a period
in which they are received but as revenue of the future period or
periods in which they are "earned." These amounts are carried
as "unearned revenue"-that is, liabilities to transfer goods or
render services in the future-until the earning process is com-
plete. The recognition of this revenue in the future period results
in recording a decrease in a liability rather than an increase in
an asset.
Although this method is generally employed by taxpayers for pur-
poses of financial reporting, the courts and the Internal Revenue
Service have not accepted it for tax purposes.
A. The Code and Early Case Law
Despite the traditional denial of the deferral of unearned in-
come, it has long been the policy of the government to reconcile
tax accounting methods with accepted business accounting prac-
tices. President Eisenhower expressed this policy in his state of the
union and budget message of January, 1954, and specifically rec-
ommended that unearned income be taxed as it is earned rather
than as it is received.9 Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as originally enacted, contained section 452, Prepaid In-
come. 10 This section provided for the deferral of prepaid income
until earned by delivery of the goods or rendition of the services.
Advance payments could be dererred for up to six years or, with
the Commissioner's consent, for a longer period.
Although the transition year revenue loss resulting from the
enactment of section 452 was originally expected to be around $47
million, by 1955 the estimates of the one year loss had risen to as
high as $1 billion." As the treasury could ill afford such a loss of
revenue, section 452 was repealed retroactively in 1955.12
9. Budget Message, Jan. 1954, Tax Recommendations Item No. 20. This recommenda-
tion is reproduced in REPEAL OF SECTIONS 452 AND 462 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1954, S. REP. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
10. Act of June 15, 1955, ch. 143, § 1(a), 69 Stat. 134. A related section, 462, provided
a deduction for additions to reserves for estimated future expenses. Act of June 15, 1955,
ch. 143 § l(b), 69 Stat. 134.
11. See REPEAL OF SECTIONs 452 AND 462 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954,
S. REP. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
12. Act of June 15, 1955, ch. 143 § 1, 69 Stat. 134. Also cited as a reason for the repeal
of sections 452 and 462 was the anticipated abuse of the provisions for reserves for estimated
expenses. REPEAL OF SECTIONs 452 AND 462 OF THE INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, H. R. REP.
No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
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As authority for the disallowance of deferrals of unearned in-
come, the Commissioner has relied on sections 446' 3 and 45111 of
the Code. Section 451 provides that items of income shall be in-
cluded in the gross income for the taxable year in which they are
received unless, under the accounting method employed, such
amounts are properly reportable in a different year. With a few
exceptions, the last part of this section was not accepted as author-
ity for deferring unearned income. Section 446 sets forth the per-
missible methods of accounting and requires that taxable income
be computed in accordance with the method regularly employed by
the taxpayer. However, section 446(b) provides that "if the method
used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable
income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the
Secretary or his delegate does clearly reflect income." This discre-
tion regarding the clear reflection of income has been the predomi-
nant authority on which the Commissioner has disallowed the de-
ferral of unearned income.
In the earlier cases, the Commissioner most often based the
exercise of his discretion on the "claim of right doctrine" as pro-
pounded in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet." Al-
though asserted less frequently, the "annual accounting concept"
was also advanced as a basis for rejecting deferral techniques.
Based on these doctrines the Commissioner argued that as a matter
of law any accrual method of accounting which did not report the
full amount of advances in the year of receipt did not clearly reflect
income.'7 The Service has enjoyed great success with this argument
in the Tax Court. 8
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 41, 53 Stat. 24 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 446).
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 42, 53 Stat. 24 (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 451).
15. 286 U.S. 417 (1932). See also Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953), and
United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
16. Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944); Brown v. Helver-
ing, 291 U.S. 193 (1934); INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 441. By 1960, the Commissioner had
come to rely largely on the annual accounting concept, as four circuit courts had held that
the "claim of right doctrine" was not applicable to the timing of income problem: Schlude
v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960); Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267
F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959); Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956); Beacon
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955). These decisions held that
the "claim of right doctrine" applied to questions involving a dispute over ownership of the
amount and not to issues involving the time of reporting the amount admitted to be income.
17. For a good discussion of the arguments advanced on both sides see Cromartie 836.
18. See, e.g., Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955) (advance tuition to dance studio);
Wallace A. Moritz, 21 T.C. 622 (1954) (advances for photo development); National Air-
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Although somewhat beyond the scope of this article, it should
be noted that taxpayers have had some success in challenging the
character of the receipt by arguing that the advance was not in-
come. The courts have allowed exclusion of amounts shown to
have been received under incomplete or contingent agreements. 9
Advance payments received under leases are excludable only where
it is established that they are security deposits as opposed to ad-
vance rent."0
However, in a series of three cases in the 1950's, taxpayers were
successful in directly challenging the Commissioner on the issue of
the proper time for reporting an advance payment admitted to be
income. In Beacon Publishing Company v. Commissioner,21 the
tenth circuit permitted prepaid newspaper subscriptions to be de-
ferred by an accrual taxpayer until the year in which the expenses
necessary to earn the advances were incurred. The court relied on
the fact that the accrual method of accounting prescribes that
income is to be reported in the year in which the amount is earned
or the rights become fixed. Reliance was also placed on the lan-
guage in section 451(a) of the Code stating that income need not
be reported in the year of receipt if the amount is properly ac-
counted for in a different year. The court held that the Commis-
sioner's wide discretion under section 446 of the Code could not
lines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947) (advance ticket receipts);/ South Tacoma Motor Co., 3 T.C.
411 (1944) (advances for automobile servicing); Your Health Club, Inc., 4 T.C. 385 (1944)
(advance dues); Do All Tulsa Company, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 343 (1949) (advances on
service contracts); Northern Illinois College of Optometry, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 664
(1943) (advance tuition). However, as will be discussed later in the text, the Commissioner
was much less successful in the appellate courts. See Cromartie 837. But see Clay Sewer
Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 130 1(3rd Cir. 1943).
19. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 287 F.2d 932 (1st Cir. 1961) (criminal case held
for taxpayer to extent of advances on incomplete agreement to sell goods); Woodlawn Park
Cemetery Co., 16 T.C. 1067 (1951) (advances on a fully revocable agreement to provide
burial space); Veenstra & DeHaan Coal Co., 11 T.C. 964 (1948) (due to seller's market,
taxpayer demanded advance payment for sale of coal although delivery was to be made
only if sufficient coal was available).
20. Advance rent must be reported in theyear of receipt. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b)(1957).
See, e.g., New Capital Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1958); South
Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943); Jack August, 17 T.C.
1165 (1952). Disguising advance rent as loan or as part of the sale price has been ineffective.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 395 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1968); Hyde Park Realty, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954); Blue Flame Gas Co., 54 T.C. 584 (1970).
For cases holding that the advance payment was in fact a deposit securing performance of
the lease see Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942),
and John Mantell, 17 T.C. 1143 (1952). See also Rev. Rul. 67-47, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 9.
21. 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955), rev'g 21 T.C. 610 (1954).
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be used to distort an accrual taxpayer's income by requiring the
use of the cash method for advance payments. It was noted that
since the "claim of right doctrine" presupposes a dispute as to
ownership of the payment, that doctrine was not applicable to the
question of timing of income. In 1958, three years after the deci-
sion in Beacon, section 455 was added to the Code making it
permissible to defer prepaid subscription income.
The reasoning in Beacon was relied on by two other circuit
courts in their decisions on the timing issue. In Schnessler v.
Commissioner,22 the fifth circuit reversed the Tax Court and al-
lowed the taxpayer a deduction for the amount of a reserve for
estimated expenses of performing guarantee obligations on fur-
naces sold by the taxpayer.13 Also relying largely on Beacon, the
second circuit, in Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner,24 sus-
tained an accrual taxpayer's method of deferring unearned income
from one year contingent service contracts. Although the services
were to be performed upon the customer's demand, the court ruled
that the taxpayer's deferral method in fact matched expenses with
related earnings and therefore was not a "purely artificial alloca-
tion. ' 25 This finding was based on the taxpayer's accounting re-
cords, which demonstrated a carefully estimated relationship be-
tween revenue and expense. Since the taxpayer's method clearly
reflected income, it was held that the Commissioner could not
reject the method. Although these cases may be authority for de-
ferrals today, they must be considered in light of the subsequent
Supreme Court decisions.
B. The Supreme Court Trilogy
In the first of three Supreme Court cases, Auto Club of Michi-
gan v. Commissioner,26 it was held that annual membership dues
paid in advance could not be deferred since the taxpayer's prorata
22. 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'g 24 T.C. 247 (1955).
23. For other cases favoring the taxpayer on time of deduction, see Pacific Grape
Products Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955) and Harrold v. Commissioner,
192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951).
24. 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959) rev'g 28 T.C. 378 (1957). The Commissioner will not
follow this decision. Rev. Rul. 6-85, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 181. However, Rev. Rul. 71-299,
1971-2 CuM. BULL. 218 modified Rev. Rul. 60-85 to the extent inconsistent with Rev. Proc.
71-21.
25. "Purely artificial" is the test propounded in Automobile Club of Michigan v. Com-
missioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). This was one of a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions on
deferral of unearned income and all three of the cases will be discussed later in the text.
26. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
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allocation of the membership dues was purely artificial and bore
no relation to the services to be rendered. 21 Without relying on the
"claim of right doctrine," the Court determined that the rejection
of the taxpayer's method was not an abuse of the Commissioner's
discretion.
In American Automobile Association v. United States,28 the
Supreme Court again upheld the disallowance of the deferral of
unearned automobile club dues. The Court not only relied on Auto
Club of Michigan,21 but also on the repeal of section 452 of the
Code. 0 The Court found that the repeal of section 452 was a
congressional mandate rejecting the deferral of unearned income
for tax purposes. Therefore it was again found that the Commis-
sioner had not abused his discretion by rejecting the Association's
accounting method.3 1 Immediately following this decision Con-
gress enacted section 45632 of the Code which provided for the
deferral of prepaid dues income of certain membership organiza-
tions such as the American Automobile Association. Although
section 456 of the Code overrules American Automobile Associa-
tion on its facts, the principles of law set forth therein have retained
their vitality down to the present day.
In Schlude v. Commissioner,3 the taxpayer, an Arthur Mur-
ray, Inc., franchisee, attempted to defer the unearned portion of
advance payments received under contracts for dance lessons. Al-
27. Id. at 189. It should be noted that the deferral problem was a minor issue in this
case, and, therefore, was not fully developed by the introduction into evidence of accounting
data necessary to show a reasonable relationship between income and expense, as in
Bressner.
28. 367 U.S. 687 (1961), rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 870 (1961). Certiorari to the Court
of Claims based on the conflict between that court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Bressner. However, Bressner was not overruled, but merely distinguished on its facts, and
no opinion of its correctness was stated. 367 U.S. at 687, 691 n.4.
29. Unlike the facts in Auto Club of Michigan, the deferral issue was fully developed
by accounting data supporting the accruals. However, in American Automobile Associa-
tion, the Supreme Court agreed with Court of Claims that although the method employed
was in accord with accepted accounting standards, the taxpayer's system failed to qualify
under the annual accounting concept due to the fact that performance of the service was
contingent upon demand by members and could occur in the next tax year. 367 U.S. at 690-
92.
30. Act of June 15, 1955, ch. 143, § 1, 69 Stat. 134.
31. However, the repeal was not intended to have any effect on prior law. H.R. REP.
No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1955). The Court ignored this expression of intent and
stated that "the cold fact is that it repealed the only law incontestably permitting the
practice upon which the Association depends." 367 U.S. at 695.
32. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 456 ("Prepaid Dues Income of Certian Membership
Organizations").
33. 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
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though the contracts provided for a set number of lessons within a
certain period of time, the exact dates for the lessons were to be
arranged by the pupil and the instructor. Relying on American
Automobile Association,34 the Court based its decision on the
congressional mandate against deferrals implicit in the repeal of
section 452 and a finding that the taxpayer's method of accounting
for services to be rendered upon demand was artificial. 5
These three Supreme Court decisions stand for the proposition
that, absent contrary statutory provisions, it is not an abuse of the
Commissioner's discretion to disallow the deferral of unearned
income, at least where the taxpayer's accounting method fails to
show a reasonably certain relationship between the amount de-
ferred and the future performance. The Commissioner has enjoyed
resounding success in the application of the Supreme Court deci-
sions.
C. Application of the Supreme Court Trilogy
The lower courts had no difficulty finding that the Supreme
Court decisions controlled virtually every case involving the defer-
ral of unearned income from service contracts. 6 The courts also
34. The Court noted that, despite the enactment of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 456,
The Principles of American Automobile Association were fully applicable here.
35. It should be noted that the taxpayer's method attempted to correlate income and
expense by including in income each year an amount corresponding to the number of lessons
given to each pupil. However, the Court noted that fixed expenses such as commissions were
not accrued but were deducted in the first year of the contract. 372 U.S. at 132.
36. See E. Morris Cox, 43 T.C. 448 (1965) (prepaid investment management services),
and Paul B. Huebner, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 406 (1966) (prepaid legal fees). For cases
involving a mixture of rent and services, see Parchester Beach Club Corp. v. Commissioner,
335 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1964) (beach club dues) and Wild Acres Rest Home, Inc., 26 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 391 (1967) (lump sum prepayment for rest home care). In New England Tank
Indus. of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Commissioner, 413 F.2d 1038 (1st Cir. 1969), advance
payment to build and rent storage tanks was held to be rent, as taxpayer failed to segregate
the advance for rent from the advance for services, therefore the total amount was includa-
ble at receipt under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b) (1957). But see Petroleum Heat and Power Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1300 (Ct. Cl. 1969) involving prepaid service contracts to
overhaul furnaces, wherein the court found for the taxpayer and deferral was permitted
within one year from a short period to the next tax year. For cases disallowing deferrals
under warranty contracts see Bell Electric Co., 45 T.C. 158 (1965) and L.L. Crosby, 35 T.C.
739 (1961). For cases involving sale of coupons for services to be performed in the future,
see Automobile Club of New York, Inc. v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1962) and
P. F. Scheidelman & Sons, Inc., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 168 (1965). For cases involving
advances received on pre-need funeral plans, see Angelus Funeral Home v. Commissioner,
407 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1969); Hamilton Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d
905 (6th Cir. 1968); Jefferson Membrial Gardens, Inc. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 161 (5th
Cir. 1968); and Prichard Funeral Home, Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1399 (1962).
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held that the American Automobile Association and Schlude
decisions controlled other timing questions, notably the timing of
deductions.37
Taxpayers seeking to defer fdvance payments received for the
sale of goods attempted to distinguish their cases on the basis that
the Supreme Court decisions involved contracts for the rendition
of services. It was argued that requiring the advance payments to
be included in income in the year of receipt was an unconstitutional
tax on gross receipts and a denial of the return of capital con-
cept .3  However, in Fifth and York Company v. United States, 39
the court decided that the reasoning in Schlude controlled the
treatment of advance payments for the sale of goods. Since section
452 of the Code applied to sale of goods as well as service con-
tracts, it was held that the congressional mandate against the defer-
ral of unearned income was also applicable to advance payments
for the sale of goods. 0
A problem of more current interest is the effect of the Supreme
Court decisions on the holdings of Beacon, Schuessler and
Bressner. It is interesting that the Supreme Court in both Auto
37. As soon as it was clear that unearned income could not be deferred, taxpayers took
up the argument that there should be allowed a deduction for future expenses. However,
the courts held that the three Supreme Court cases also controlled this issue, and the
deductions for future expenses were denied. See McAllister v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 581
(9th Cir. 1969) (value of future refunds of insurance sales commissions); Villafranca v.
Commissioner, 359 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1966) (cost of future dancing lessons); Streight Radio
and Television, Inc. v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960) (cost of service con-
tract); Simplified Tax Records, Inc., 41 T.C. 75 (1963) (cost of tax return preparation); and
Bernard J. Husnik, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 163 (1969) (cost of discount food coupons).
38. For a good discussion of these problems, see Poole, The Taxation of Prepaid Sales
of Goods, 24 TAx L. REV. 375 (1969), and Comment, The Prepaid Income Rule: Constitu-
tional and Practical Aspects of Its Application To the Sale of Goods, 21 MIAMI L. REV.
866 (1967).
39. 234 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Ky. 1964). The case involved a two for one sale of automo-
biles where first year price included another car to be delivered in the next year.
40. Id. at 424. For other cases involving sale of goods, see Martin v. United States, 411
F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1969) (suit club); Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner,
407 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1969), affg 47 T.C. 139 (1966) (advertising signs); S. Garber, Inc.,
51 T.C. 733 (1969) (custom-made fur coats); Chester Farrara, 44 T.C. 189 (1965) (suit club);
Modernaire Interiors, Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1334 (1968) (custom-made furniture).
But see Consolidated Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 829 (7th
Cir. 1963), wherein the taxpayer prevailed because a contract to produce cameras, from
which advances were received, was contingent and incomplete (see note 19 supra). Where
the taxpayer could not come within the requirements of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 455, it
was held that the rule of Schlude controlled the prepaid subscription income. Decision, Inc.,
47 T.C. 58 (1966) (advance subscriptions for a job directory); William 0. McMahon, 45
T.C. 221 (1965) (bulletins on automobile values).
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Club of Michigan4 and American Automobile Association2
merely distinguished Beacon and Scheussler on their facts and
refused to express an opinion on the correctness of the lower court
decisions. In Schlude the circuit court opinions were not men-
tioned. However, from the Tax Court's statement in Bell Electric
Co. v. Commissioner,43 that "they [Beacon, Schuessler and
Bressner] must be considered in light of the subsequent authorita-
tive decisions of the Supreme Court", it appears that the prior
circuit court decisions have lost much of their vitality. Irrespective
of the present strength of Beacon and Bressner and the overall
success of the Commissioner in the application of the Supreme
Court trilogy, there is current authority for the deferral of un-
earned income where the taxpayer cannot meet the requirements
of Revenue Procedure 71-21 or Treasury Regulation 1.451-5.
D. The Artnell Decision
In Artnell Company v. Commissioner," the seventh circuit
found that the Supreme Court had left an opening for a decision
that where the time and extent of the future performance was so
certain that a method of deferring unearned income could clearly
reflect income the Commissioner's rejection of such method would
constitute an abuse of discretion. The case involved the receipts
from season tickets sold by the Chicago White Sox baseball team.
Since the tax year involved ended on May 31, the White Sox
sought to defer that portion of the season ticket receipts which
corresponded to the games to be played after the end of the tax
year. The court distinguished the prior Supreme Court decisions
on the basis of certainty of time and extent of performance.45 The
facts in Artnell were found to be more closely analogous to the
permissible deferral of prepaid subscription income46 than to the
situations considered in American Automobile Association and
Schlude. Finding that there must be situations in which deferral
techniques do clearly reflect income, the court reversed and re-
manded the case to the Tax Court for a determination of whether
the White Sox' method in fact clearly reflected income. On re-
41. 353 U.S. at 189 n.20.
42. 367 U.S. at 691 n.4.
43. 45 T.C. 158, 166 (1965).
44. 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968), rev~g 48 T.C. 411 (1967).
45. The Seventh Circuit placed little weight on the uncertainty of dates resulting from
rain-outs. 400 F.2d at 984.
46. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 455.
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mand, 7 the Tax Court relied on generally accepted accounting
principles48 and found in favor of the taxpayer. The court noted
that the White Sox method of accounting was not a perfect reflec-
tion of income in that 38 percent of the expenses were deducted in
the initial period in which only 31 percent of the games were
played. Fortunately for the taxpayer, however, the alternative
method suggested by the Service-that all of the season ticket
receipts should be included in income in the initial period-clearly
was erroneous. 9 Despite this finding, it appears from a close read-
ing of the two Artnell opinions that the taxpayer need only show
that his method of accounting clearly reflects income, and upon
such a showing he need not address himself to the method ad-
vanced by the Commissioner.
At least in the seventh circuit, and probably elsewhere, taxpay-
ers, upon a showing of requisite certainty of the time and extent
of future performance, may defer the unearned portion of advance
payments. Although the facts of Artnell involved services, presum-
ably the rule applies equally to advances for the sale of goods.
However, taxpayers need not establish the requisite degree of cer-
tainty where their advance payments qualify for deferral under
Revenue Procedure 71-21 or Treasury Regulation 1.451-5.
III. REVENUE PROCEDURE 71-21 AND TREASURY REGULATION
1.451-5
Revenue Procedure 71-21" was promulgated by the Commis-
sioner in furtherance of the policy to reconcile tax and financial
accounting treatment of unearned income.51 The Commissioner
has exercised the discretion vested in him pursuant to section 446
of the Code to allow certain accrual method taxpayers to defer for
one year the inclusion of unearned income from services to be
47. Artnell Company, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403 (1970).
48. As neither party offered expert testimony as to accepted business accounting prac-
tices, the court acted on its own concept of sound accounting principles. 29 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. at 405.
49. The petitioner has the burden of proof,,and although it has failed to prove
that the White Sox method of accounting perfectly reflected its income, it has shown
that the respondent's method is erroneous .... Often, we accept the respondent's
judgment in the selection of a method of accounting that will clearly reflect income,
but there is no justification for doing so when his method clearly is less desirable
than that of the petitioner.
29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 406.
50. 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 549, superceding Rev. Proc. 70-21, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 501.
51. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 2.
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rendered. 5 The agreement under which the advance payment is
received must require that performance of the services be com-
pleted within the next tax year following the year of receipt.53
Unearned income from contingent service agreements will qualify
for deferral where, if the taxpayer sells, leases or installs the prop-
erty to be serviced, such property is offered for sale, lease or instal-
lation without the contingent service contract.54
Advance payments for the sale of goods to be delivered in the
future may be deferred under new Treasury Regulation 1.45 1-5.11
Although in a few situations the regulation permits deferral until
delivery, most taxpayers will be controlled by the so-called excep-
tion for inventoriable goods on hand or available.56 Under this
exception the taxpayer must include advance payments in income
by the end of the second tax year following the year in which the
total advances equal or exceed the cost of the goods to be
delivered.57
The balance of this article will examine these new rules, noting
areas in need of clarification, pose problems in the application of
the new rules and suggest possible solutions to those problems.
A. Transitional Rules
Both of the new rules apply only to taxpayers using the accrual
method of accounting. 8 However, most taxpayers desiring the ben-
efits of the regulation are required to maintain an inventory59 and
therefore will already be using the accrual method."0 Since the
regulation only requires an accrual method for purchases and
sales,"' taxpayers may use the combination of methods under sec-
tion 446(c)(4) of the Code.12 The revenue procedure is slightly more
52. Id. § 1.
53. Id. § 3.02. But see the limited exceptions under §§ 3.04 and 3.05, to be discussed
later in the text.
54. Id. § 3.07.
55. The Regulation also applies to long-term contracts, and therefore all principles
applicable to sale of goods also apply to long-term contracts. See also, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-
3 (1971) ("Long-term Contracts").
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(c) (1971).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(c) (3) (1971).
58. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.02; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(a)(1) (1971).
59. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 471, 472.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(i) (1957).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(a)(1) (1971). However, the regulation is applicable only to
sales of goods held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1) (iv) (1957).
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restrictive in that it requires the total use of the accrual method of
accounting. 3
However, it may not be necessary for taxpayers to use the
accrual method for all purposes. If the taxpayer is engaged in more
than one business it should be necessary to adopt the accrual
method only for that segment in which the taxpayer seeks to defer
unearned income." For example, an attorney who also teaches a
bar review course could defer advance tuition,65 or a professor who
is also an author may be able to defer advance payments for books
to be written.
Both the new revenue procedure and regulation are treated as
methods of accounting 6 and, therefore, the adoption of either rule
is a change of accounting method within the meaning of sections
446 and 481 of the Code. 7 The problem created by treating the
adoption of these new rules as a change of accounting method is
that the Commissioner must consent to the change." In order to
secure consent, the taxpayer must agree to take into account result-
ing adjustments in a manner satisfactory to the Commissioner. 9
However, the new regulation provides that taxpayers already using
the method therein prescribed need not apply for a change of
method. 70 Although it is not so provided, it appears that this rule
will also apply to taxpayers already reporting under the method
prescribed in Revenue Procedure 71-21.71
Revenue Procedure 70-2772 outlines the basic requisites for ob-
taining the Commissioner's consent. Taxpayers seeking to change
accounting methods must file form 3115 (application for change
of accounting method) with the Commissioner within 180 days of
63. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.02.
64. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 446(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (d) (1957).
65. See Sobeloff, New Prepaid Income Rules: IRS Reversal of Position WillAid Many
Taxpayers, 33 J. TAXATION 194, 195 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sobeloff].
66. Rev. Proc. 71-21, § 3.14; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(e) (1971).
67. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 5.01, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(e) (1971).
68. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 446(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2) (1957).
69. See Rev. Proc. 70-27, 1970-2 Cum. Bull. 509, to be discussed later in the text.
70. Treas, Reg. § 1.451-5(e)(2) (1971). For taxable year ending in 1970, taxpayers could
have applied for consent to change to the new method even after their returns were filed if
Form 3115 was filed within 180 days after March 13, 1971. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(e)(1)
(1971).
71. This result may be inferred from Rev. Proc. 71-21 §§ 3.14, 5.01.
72. 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 509. For a general discussion of Rev. Proc. 70-27, see Sanders,
Final Rules on Accounting Method Changes Represent a Much Needed Clarification, 34
J. TAXATION 116 (1971).
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the beginning of the proposed year of change.73 The real problem
arising from a change of method is that resulting adjustments must
be spread over an appropriate period, usually ten years.74
Adjustments arising from the change of methods will be a re-
sult of the double inclusion of the portion of the advance payments
earned after the year of receipt. Prior to the year of change the
taxpayer will have included all advances in income in the year of
receipt. Beginning in the year of change receipts must be included
in income as they are earned and, therefore, some of the payments
received and included in prior years must again be included when
earned in the year of change. The Commissioner could require that
the amount doubly included be deducted ratably over a ten year
period. For example, assume a taxpayer, under an otherwise quali-
fied agreement, is obligated to render services over a two year
period, forty percent to be completed in year one and the remain-
ing sixty percent to be performed in year two. Assume further that
full payment of $100 is received in year one. In accordance with
the old method of reporting advance payments at receipt, the full
payment was included in income in year one. If, in year two, the
taxpayer applies for a change to the method prescribed in Revenue
Procedure 71-21 there will be a resulting adjustment of $60. Since
in the year of change income must be reported as earned, the
taxpayer will report in year two the $60 earned that year despite
the fact that this amount has already been reported as part of the
$100 of income in year one. The $60 adjustment for the amount
included twice will be spread out over ten years allowing the tax-
payer an extra $6 deduction in year two and the following nine
'years.75 However, the Commissioner could permit the adjustments
to be taken into account over a shorter period, or perhaps even
allow the adjustments to be fully accounted for in the year of
change. The terms of the consent agreement will be determined on
a case-by-case basis depending on the usual subjective factors con-
sidered in any other settlement. However, since advances received
in the year of change will be deferrable without adjustment, the
adoption of the deferral method will result in some one year loss
of revenue. Since this loss could be reduced by spreading the ad-
justments, it is anticipated that the Commissioner will generally
73. Rev. Proc. 70-27 §§ 2, 4.01. For good cause the time limit may be extended to nine
months. Id. § 4.02.
74. Id. §§ 3.01, 4.01.
75. For another example, see Sobeloff at 195.
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require that taxpayers account for their adjustments over the full
ten year period.
Taxpayers could avoid the effects of these transitional rules by
shifting the business activities which generate the unearned income
to newly created members of the taxpayers' controlled groups.
Since such new members may adopt any permissible method of
accounting without consent,76 the controlled group could circum-
vent the transitional rules. The revenue procedure has effectively
prevented this manipulation to some extent, however, by enlarging
the definition of a change of accounting method to encompass
situations where related persons (as defined in section 482 of the
Code) have performed services similar to those offered by the tax-
payer within any of the five years preceding the year of adoption
by the taxpayer.71
Another way to avoid the ten year spread, rather than creating
a new related taxpayer, is by becoming an artificially new taxpayer
by eliminating the unearned income account before the year of
change. If the unearned income account can be eliminated, there
will be no resulting adjustments. Current unearned income may be
disposed of by renegotiating existing contracts so that, as of the
year of change, they become, in effect, new obligations qualifying
for deferral treatment. Alternatively, since by the year of change
advances on existing obligations have already been reported at
receipt, existing service contracts could be extended beyond the
time limit of the revenue procedure, thereby avoiding the double
inclusion. The taxpayer could also pay a third party to assume the
prior obligations. 78
One obvious problem is that such manipulations may cause the
Commissioner to withhold his consent to the change of method.
Although the taxpayer may sue to compel consent, this would be
practical only where there are substantial tax savings at stake.
Perhaps the only effective way to avoid the adjustment spread is
to delay adoption of the new method until the unearned income
account has been naturally eliminated by the performance of all
prior obligations. Under this method the taxpayer could not accept
advance payments under new obligations until such time as per-
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(1)(1957). The method prescribed in Rev. Proc. 71-21 is an
acceptable method of accounting. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.14.
77. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 5.01. This provision was not contained in Rev. Proc. 70-21.
78. See Sobeloff 195.
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formance is completed on existing contracts qualifying for defer-
ral.7" Although taxpayers seeking to adopt the revenue procedure
need only refuse advances for one year, if this method is unaccepta-
ble, as probably will be the case for those selling goods, it appears
that the adjustment spread will be unavoidable.
B. General Requirements of the New Rules
Although under the new revenue procedure the underlying
agreements may be oral,8" it is suggested that all such agreements
be reduced to writing, as it may be necessary later to establish the
fact that the services were required to be rendered by the end of
the tax year following the year of receipt.8 ' Taxpayers must also
maintain adequate books and records to verify the deferrals. 2 Al-
though the new regulation does not require a writing, contracts for
the sale of goods will generally be reduced to writing under the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.83 The regulation
also requires taxpayers to file an information schedule with each
return.84 This schedule must set forth the total advance payments
received in the current year, the total advance payments received
in past years but not yet included in income, and the total of such
advance payments included in current income. The preparation of
such a schedule should cast no real burden on taxpayers, as the
supporting workpapers will be needed to prepare other financial
statements.
Generally, under both of the new methods, income is to be
reported when earned according to the method of accounting con-
sistently employed by the taxpayer." Income from contingent serv-
ice contracts may be reported on: a statistical basis, if adequate
data is available; a straight-line basis, if it is not unreasonable to
anticipate that ratable portions of the services will be performed
each tax year; or any other basis which, in the opinion of the
79. Where service contracts extend beyond the one year limit there will be no adjust-
ments, as they do not qualify for deferrals and the receipts will not be again reported as
earned.
80. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.02.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 4.
83. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201.
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(d) (1971).
85. Rev. Proc. 71-21 §§ 3.11, 3.14; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(b)(2) (1971). Including ad-
vance payments in the year of receipt is, of course, always permissible. Rev. Proc. 71-21
§ 3.01; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(b) (1) (1971).
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Commissioner, clearly reflects income."6 Under both rules ad-
vances are considered received when they become due and
payable.8 1
The new revenue procedure, by its one year limitation, disquali-
fies advances received under agreements providing that some por-
tion of the services are to be performed either at a time beyond the
one year limit or at an unspecified date which may be beyond the
time limit.8 8 If, for any reason, the services under a qualified agree-
ment are in fact performed at a time beyond the one year limit,
all receipts must be included by the end of the year following the
year of first receipt.8 Bus tokens or transportation tickets with
open dates" and certificates or other evidence of a prepaid obliga-
tion to process photographic materials8' need not require complete
performance within the next year. However, regardless of when the
tokens or photo certificates are actually redeemed, the advances
must be included in income by the end of the tax year following
the year of receipt. 2
If a taxpayer utilizing either of the new rules dies or ceases to
exist, 3 or liability under the agreement otherwise ends, all ad-
vances not previously included must be included in income in the
year of cessation of the taxpayer's liability. 4 A related problem
under these provisions is the entitlement to and the timing of the
deduction for related expenses.15 A taxpayer merely ceasing to be
liable on an obligation, but not dying, may be able to accelerate
related expenses into the tax year in which the advance is included
upon providing sufficient safeguards against a later double deduc-
86. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.06. This provision was not contained in Rev. Proc. 70-21.
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5 (a) (2) (ii) (1971); Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 1.
88. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.03.
89. Id. § 3.02.
90. Id. § 3.04.
91. Id. § 3.05. This exception was not contained in Rev. Proc. 70-21. For a case where
this provision would have affected the result see Wallace A. Moritz, 21 T.C. 622 (1954).
92. Rev. Proc. §§ 3.04, 3.05.
93. Other than in a transaction to which INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 381(a) applies
(carryovers in certain corporate acquisitions).
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(0(1971); Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.13. Interestingly, both sec-
tions, by the language "dies, ceases to exist. . . or liability under the agreement otherwise
ends," apparently presuppose that death ends the taxpayer's liability. Although these provi-
sions merely require that all advance payments be included in the final return, it should be
noted that in the case of the taxpayer's death, his personal representative will be liable, in
some instances, to perform the existing obligations and, in others, to refund the advance
payments.
95. For a discussion of this matter see Sobeloff at 197.
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tion. However, if the taxpayer dies, deductions for corresponding
expenses may not be accelerated into the last return.98 This prob-
lem can be cured at the time of negotiating by establishing a price
at which the successor will take up the unperformed obligations."
Perhaps the most difficult requirement to comply with is the
so-called booking rule. Both new methods require that accruals are
to be in accordance with the methods used for purposes of all
reports (including consolidated financial statements) to sharehold-
ers, partners, other proprietors, beneficiaries and for credit pur-
poses. 8 To be eligible for the new rules, many taxpayers will have
to reorganize their financial reporting systems to conform all of
their statements to the desired tax treatment. Since both rules use
the terms "all reports and statements" it appears that a single
statement to a creditor could affect eligibility for the new rules.
The failure to defer an advance payment on any statement may
trigger the inclusion of that advance in the year of receipt. If, on
any statement, the taxpayer reports the advance upon receipt and
accelerates a reserve for related expenses, thereby merely including
only the gross profit, the full amount of the advance will have been
included in gross income and therefore deferral treatment will al-
most certainly be denied.'
Unfortunately, many otherwise eligible taxpayers who will not
permit tax accounting methods to dictate the methods used for
financial reporting will lose the benefits of these new rules. Al-
though to be acceptable a method of accounting must clearly re-
flect income, the door is open for manipulation or use of arbitrary
figures in the taxpayer's books which will be controlling for tax
purposes. It has been suggested' 0 that the validity of this booking
rule requirement is questionable, as there is an absence of specific
statutory authorization for such a far reaching requirement. Even
considering that hearings are held before the finalization of a regu-
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(b) (1957).
97. A related problem is that of unclaimed goods and services. Rev. Proc. 71-21 pro-
vides a solution by requiring inclusion of all advances by the end of the tax year next
succeeding the year of receipt. This rule also applies to open-date bus tokens and prepaid
photo development obligations. There may be a problem where gift certificates are not
redeemed. However, gift certificates are covered by the inventoriable goods exception of
the regulation and the problems connected therewith will be examined later.
98. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.11; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(b) (2) (1971). Rev. Proc. 71-21
§ 3.11 differs slightly from the regulation in that it states that taxpayers shall include "no
less than the amount of such payment included" for all reports.
99. For a good discussion of the booking rule see Sobeloff at 199-200.
100. Id.
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lation and that the new revenue procedure is merely an exercise of
the discretion vested in the Commissioner, it appears that the
booking rule has an unreasonably far reaching effect on taxpayers'
financial accounting systems. This result could be neutralized to
some extent through a liberal construction of the terms "all reports
and statements."
C. Other Problems Under the Revenue Procedure
The Commissioner apparently feared that taxpayers would
abuse the new method by securing the deferral of advances beyond
the one year limit through the use of consecutive two year agre-
meents distributed over a group of related taxpayers. To prevent
this, the term "agreement," as used in the new revenue procedure,
includes other agremeents between the taxpayer or related persons
and the recipients of the benefits of the performance under the
initial agremeent where such other agreements provide for the ren-
dition of similar services over a period of time that is substantially
consecutive to that of the original agreement.1"' "Related person"
is defined as any other person owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests within the meaning of section 482
of the Code.' Apparently this provision will effectively prevent the
use of consecutive two year agreements spread over a control
group as a device for extending the time limitation of the revenue
procedure. Presumably, the definition of agreement also includes
option contracts as well as short year agreements such as service
contracts on air conditioners for only the months of June through
August. Therefore, it appears that taxpayers desiring full deferral
of advances from long term service arrangements will have to settle
for a mere expectation of renewal. This may be acceptable where
the customers, though not legally obligated to renew, are, practi-
cally speaking, unlikely to switch to a competitor.
There is a limited alternative available to taxpayers who find
it unacceptable to rely on a mere expectation of renewal. The new
revenue procedure applies to agreements as they exist at the end
of the taxable year of receipt.13 Since the date of execution of the
agreement is irrelevant, it should be permissible to consider the
next to last year covered by the agreement as the year of receipt.
101. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.09.
102. Id. § 3.10. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (1962). Generally, references to taxpayers
include related persons. Rev. Proc. 71-21 §§ 3.07, 3.09, 5.01.
103. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.02.
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By testing the agreement as of the receipt of the payment due in
the second to last year of the agreement, it appears possible to
defer for one year the unearned portion of such payment even
though the agreement as a whole exceeds the time limitations of
the revenue procedure. However, such lengthy agreements will pro-
vide tax savings only where the non-deferrable advances received
in the initial years are either minimal in amount or so restricted
as to use that they are in fact mere security deposits." 4 Due to cash
flow problems, such agreements also must require only a minimal
outlay for expenses in the initial years.
There is a question as to the proper method of allocating the
advances to the tax years involved. If the advance payments are
allocated on the first-in, first-out (fifo) basis, taxpayers should be
able to secure deferral treatment for the last two years covered by
the agreement."' For example, assume that a contract covers three
years and that five percent of the services are to be rendered in the
first year, fifty-five percent the second year and forty percent the
third year. The total contract price is $10,000 of which $1,500 is due
in the first year, $7,500 in the second year and $1,000 the third year.
Since the contract is to be tested as of the time of each receipt, a
problem will arise only if part of the advance received in the first
year is allocated to the third year, thereby extending the years
involved beyond the one year limit. However, if the allocation is
on the fifo basis, the payment received in the first year will be
earned over the first two years and be reported as income upon
receipt in year one. Therefore, the agreement as of the receipt of
the advance in year two will meet the requirements of the new rules
and the unearned portion of the payment received in year two may
be deferred to year three. Assuming that the fifo method is used
in the above example, $1,500 will be reported at receipt in year one
with $1,000 of it (the excess of payment over percent earned in year
one) to be part of the amount earned in year two. For year two,
$3,000 of the receipt is deferred to year three when that amount
plus the $1,000 received in year three will constitute the third year's
income. The fifo method appears to be the most sound reporting
basis, and if accepted by the Service and the courts, taxpayers will
be able to defer advances received in the next to last year under
service agreements exceeding the one year limit.
104. See notes 19 and 20 supra.
105. For a thorough analysis and example of this problem, see Battle, Advance Pay-
ments for Services: Limited Deferral Permitted, 57 A.B.A.J. 182, 184-85 (1971).
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As noted above, income from contingent service contracts is
eligible for deferral and may be reported on a statistical basis, a
straight line basis or any other method which clearly reflects in-
come." 6 Deferral is permitted even though the agreement includes
an obligation to replace parts or materials where such obligation
is merely incidental to the main agreement providing for the per-
formance of services. 07 Hopefully, the term "incidental" will be
construed liberally, thereby maximizing the application of the new
revenue procedure.
Unlike its predecessor of 1970,18 Revenue Procedure 71-21
permits the deferral of advances from contingent service contracts
where the taxpayer sells, leases, builds, installs or constructs the
property subject to the service agreement. However, the taxpayer,
in the normal course of business, must also offer to sell, lease,
build, install or construct the property without a contingent service
agreement.' Does the language "in the normal course of busi-
ness" cover the situation where a taxpayer, selling and servicing
elevators, will sell an elevator at a discount if the customer also
purchases a service contract? In the elevator business, as well as
many other fields, it is often the practice to sell the elevator at cost
if a profitable service contract can be secured. This type of sales
policy may be less desirable because service contracts eligible for
deferral must be limited to two years, and the mere expectation of
renewal may not be sufficient security.
It should also be noted that guarantee or warranty contracts
are excluded from the benefits of the new revenue procedure." 0 The
reason given for excluding warranties and guarantees is the diffi-
culty in formulating adequate rules necessary to administer such
provisions. However, this problem is under consideration by the
Service."' For the time being, it is suggested that taxpayers exer-
cise care to insure that their contingent service agreements do not
technically become warranty or guarantee contracts.
As has been the rule for many years, advance rentals must be
included in income in the year of receipt regardless of the period
106. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.06.
107. Id. § 3.07.
108. Rev. Proc. 70-21 § 3.05.
109. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.07.
110. Id. § 3.08. But see Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956)
allowing a deduction for a reserve to cover future warranty obligations on furnaces sold by
the taxpayer. For other warranty cases holding for the Commissioner, see note 36 supra.
I 11. IRS Technical Information Release 1055 (August 6, 1970).
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covered or the method of accounting employed by the taxpayer."2
The new revenue procedure also adopts this rule, as advance rent-
als are specifically excluded from its scope. However, in situations
involving a mixture of rent and services, the Commissioner appears
to be taking a liberal position. The new method provides that
payments for use or occupancy of rooms or other space where
significant services are also rendered to the occupants are not
deemed advance rentals.13 Also, Revenue Ruling 72-49,"1 the lat-
est application of the new revenue procedure, provides that ad-
vances received by telephone companies from subscribers for the
following month's telephone service are not to be considered a
rental of the equipment and are, therefore, properly deferrable.
Considering the position taken in the above revenue ruling as well
as in the new revenue procedure itself, it appears that the Commis-
sioner is taking a liberal position with regard to advances received
under agreements involving a mixture of rent and service."' It is
hoped that this position will be extended to other applications of
both the new revenue procedure and the new regulation.
D. The Inventoriable Goods Exception
The exception for inventoriable goods applies to the sale of
goods properly includable in inventory, and provides that when a
taxpayer receives a substantial advance payment (the cost of the
goods to be delivered) and has on hand or available, through a
normal source of supply, goods of a substantially similar kind and
sufficient quantity to satisfy the agreement, all advances received
must be included in income by not later than the end of the second
taxable year following the year in which the substantial advance
was received."' Advance payments received after the second year
following receipt of a substantial advance are includable in the year
112. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b) (1957).
113. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.08. Situations covered include boarding houses, apartment
houses, hotel service and the like. This provision was not contained in Rev. Proc. 70-21.
114. 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 6, at 13. See also Rev. Rul. 71-299, 1971-2 Cum. BULL.
218, which, by modifying past rulings to the extent inconsistent with Rev. Proc. 71-21, in
effect excludes advances for college dormitory room and board from the meaning of ad-
vance rent. Rev. Rul. 65-141, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 210, as modified.
115. For the Commissioner's former position on cases involving rent-service mixture see
cases cited note 36 supra.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(c)(1971). The regulation contains a comprehensive example.
Id. § 1.451-5(c)(4). For a good discussion of the inventoriable goods exception see Cozine
& Showfety, Advance Payments For Goods and Services, 2 TAX ADVISOR 602 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Cozine & Showfety].
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of receipt."17 In the year that the advances are first included in the
income the taxpayer must deduct the costs and expenses included
in the inventory at the end of such year or, if there are no goods
then on hand, the estimated cost of the goods necessary to satisfy
the agreement."'
The above exception will require certain adjustments to prevent
a double accounting for inventory. Although there should be no
problem for larger taxpayers with sophisticated inventory control
systems, smaller taxpayers must keep detailed inventory cost re-
cords. This may be done by use of a suspense account which would
be kept separate throughout the life of the agreement and then
closed out to ending inventory in the year of delivery.
However, there appear to be several unanswered questions sur-
rounding the inventoriable goods exception. If, for example, the
advance payments become substantial in the year in which the
requisite goods are neither on hand nor available, there will be a
question as to which year the taxpayer must include the advances
in income. The exception could be construed to require that both
elements (substantial advance and requisite goods) be present at
once. By this construction, if both are not present in the same year
the exception would not apply, and therefore the taxpayer would
be able to defer advances until the year of delivery. A more proba-
ble construction would be to start the two year period running from
the end of the first year following receipt of a substantial advance,
but not before the year in which the goods are on hand or
available."9
Another problem arises where a taxpayer is obligated to sell
identical units to several different customers. The question is
whether the taxpayer may allocate the units on hand or available
over the several contracts or whether the taxpayer must use a fifo
method of allocation under which all units available would be
allocated to the obligation first incurred, thereby causing the two
year limit to start at an earlier date."' Assuming that the taxpayer
may spread the units over.all of the obligations, a longer deferral
will be available since the two year period will not begin to run
until there are sufficient goods on hand or available to satisfy all
of the obligations.
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(c)(2) (1971).
118. Id. § 1.451-5(c) (1) (ii). Once these costs are deducted they are not to be taken into
account again. Id. § 1.451-5(c) (2).
119. For a discussion of these alternative constructions see Cozine & Showfety at 604.
120. See Cozine & Showfety 605.
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Still another problem not provided for in the regulation is that
of discounting the price of goods to be delivered at a relatively
distant future date. 2' A taxpayer selling caskets under a pre-need
plan may charge a fifty year old customer only $400 for a casket
ordinarily selling for $1,000. Assuming that the cost of the casket
is $500, the advances will never become "substantial" and therefore
the two year limit will never begin to run. Although the use of the
customer's money is the equivalent of a substantial advance, these
potentially lengthy deferrals will be available only to a very limited
group of taxpayers.
The sale of gift certificates is also covered by the new regula-
tion. The inventoriable goods exception applies to the sale of goods
which, as in gift certificates, are not identifiable at the time of
receipt of the payment. 22 The definition of substantial advance
payments includes all advance payments received with respect to
unidentifiable goods, thereby beginning the two year period upon
receipt of the sale price of the gift certificate. 2 1 In addition, the
cost of the goods sold under a gift certificate are not deductible
until the year of redemption.12' These limitations do not appear to
be unreasonable in light of the fact that most gift certificates are
redeemed or expire within two years. If a longer deferral is desired,
the taxpayer must sufficiently restrict the subject of the certificate
so that the goods will be "identifiable." However, such restricted
gift certificates probably would not be very marketable.'25
E. Application of the New Rules in Conjunction with Each Other
It appears that the revenue procedure and the regulation could
be both applicable to a transaction in which the taxpayer sells
goods with an accompanying service contract. As noted above, any
"incidental" replacement agreements are considered services under
the revenue procedure.126 The new regulation contains a reciprocal
provision which is applicable where an agreement provides not
only for the sale of goods, but also for the performance of services
as an integral part of such sale.'2 Advances on such service obliga-
121. See Sobeloff 197.
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(c)(1) (i) (1971).
123. Id. § 1.451-5(c) (3).
124. Id. § 1.451-5(c) (1) (iii).
125. For related material see Treas. Reg. § 1.451-4 and cases cited note 36 supra.
126. Rev. Proc. 71-21 § 3.07.
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(a) (2) (i) (b) (1971).
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tions are treated as part of the sale price of the goods..Even if the
services are not an integral part of the sale, deferral is permissible
under the regulation to the extent that the corresponding payment
is properly "allocable" to the sale of goods.'1 In addition, the
portion of the advance payment which is not properly "allocable"
to the sale may be deferred under the regulation if it amounts to
less than five percent of the total contract price.129 Presumably,
where a service obligation meets neither the "integral" nor "alloca-
ble" tests, the advances thereunder may still be deferrable pursuant
to the method prescribed in Revenue Procedure 71-21.
For example, assume that a taxpayer receives a $200 advance
payment under an agreement to sell a central air conditioning unit
for $900 and a contingent service agreement for $100. Since the
service contract is not an integral part of the sale and its price
exceeds five percent of the total contract price (or $50), the full $200
would not be deferrable under the new regulation. However, as-
suming delivery in a later year, $180 may be deferred, as that
amount represents the portion (90%) of the advance allocable to
the sale of goods. Had the price of the service agreement been $40,
all of the advance payment would have been deferrable pursuant
to the five percent exception under the regulation. It should be
noted that service agreements within the five percent exception are
not subject to the revenue procedure and therefore deferrals ex-
ceeding the one year limit are permissible. Again, assuming the
price of the service contract to be $100, the portion of the advance
not allocable to the sale of goods, $20, will be eligible for deferral
treatment if the service agreement fits within the requirements of
Revenue Procedure 71-21. However, if the air conditioner is to be
delivered in the year after the service is received, the service con-
tract must terminate by the end of the year of delivery to be within
the one year limit of the revenue procedure. Also, the air condi-
tioner must be offered for sale without the service contract. If the
agreements fit all these requirements, the entire advance payment
of $200 will be deferrable by use of a combination of Treasury
Regulation 1.451-5 and Revenue Procedure 71-21.
F. The New Deferral Methods Applied in Conjunction with the
Rule of Artnell
An interesting question is what the effect of these two new rules
128. Id. § 1.451-5(a) (3).
129. Id.
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will be on the prior case law, particularly the Artnell decision.
Perhaps the Commissioner had in mind that the benefits provided
for in the new rules will temporarily decrease litigation over the
unearned income issue. The revenue procedure is merely an exer-
cise of the Commissioner's discretion, and it should have no effect
on prior case law as authority for the deferral of unearned income
where the underlying agreement does not qualify under the new
rules. The Artnell decision is still useful where, for example, a
taxpayer sells three year season tickets to baseball games. Assum-
ing similar certainty as to the time and extent of performance, the
portion of the price allocable to the last two years should be eligible
for deferral even though the "agreement" is not within the time
limit of Revenue Procedure 71-21.
It may be possible to secure some long term deferrals by com-
bining the principles of the Artnell decision and the new revenue
procedure. Taxpayers, such as the elevator company in the exam-
ple above, could offer two types of service contracts. One contract,
drafted with Artnell in mind, would be long term and provide for
mandatory regular preventive maintenance inspections. This con-
tract should qualify for deferral treatment as there would be requi-
site certainty of the time and extent of performance. The other
contract would be a contingent demand service contract renewable
(but not automatically) every two years to fit within the require-
ments of the revenue procedure. The Commissioner will surely
challenge this method and assert that in substance, irrespective of
form, the two contracts constitute a single agreement. However,
the taxpayer may prevail by exhibiting non-tax reasons for the
separate contracts and showing that the contracts are both legally
and factually independent of each other. The taxpayer could argue
that there is no legal obligation to renew the contingent service
contract and show that the contracts may be and sometimes are
entered into without the other. Careful preparation at the planning
stage will be of the utmost importance. If some of the tax savings
(assuming the taxpayer prevails) are reflected in the price of the
contracts, there should be no difficulty in securing the customer's
assent to this arrangement. In view of the risk of disallowance, this
method is suggested only as a last resort to those taxpayers having
sufficient tax savings at stake to warrant litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite their relatively limited applicability, the new revenue
procedure and regulation are certainly a step toward the reconcilia-
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tion of tax and financial accounting treatment of unearned income.
These new methods, even if strictly construed, will afford some
relief to taxpayers seeking to defer their unearned income. Hope-
fully, a liberal construction will prevail, particularly with respect
to the terms "all books and records" as used in the booking rule.
There are some signs that the Commissioner is taking a liberal
position on these rules. Revenue Ruling 72-49 and the enlarged
scope of Revenue Procedure 71-21 over its predecessor in such
areas as contingent service contracts and agreements involving a
mixture of rent and service are indications of this policy.
It is suggested that these two new rules should be viewed as the
latest in a series of step by step adoptions of the generally accepted
accounting principles with more expanded rules to follow. As noted
above, one of the downfalls of the ill-fated sections 452 and 462 of
the Code was the resulting transition year revenue loss. This loss
is being reduced by a piecemeal adoption of the deferral provisions.
Irrespective of their limitations, Revenue Procedure 71-21 and
Treasury Regulation 1.451-5 are welcome additions to the tax law
for all taxpayers with unearned income.
W. CRAIG OLAFSSON
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